The objective of our study was to analyze the anti-selection that exists between the state and public hospitals in Senegal. The use of a theoretical model to highlight hospital regulation has led to a number of important results. Indeed, the optimal solution consists in introducing a distortion in the cost reduction effort required to achieve an arbitrage between productive efficiency and the extraction of the hospital’s rent. The use of a menu of non-linear contracts for hospital funding is consistent with a cost reimbursement policy (such as the overall envelope policy) while a menu of linear contracts is modelled on the fixed-price pricing system (for example, by pathology or activity).
| Published in | International Journal of Health Economics and Policy (Volume 10, Issue 3) |
| DOI | 10.11648/j.hep.20251003.12 |
| Page(s) | 90-99 |
| Creative Commons |
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited. |
| Copyright |
Copyright © The Author(s), 2025. Published by Science Publishing Group |
Public Hospital, Financing, Information Asymmetry, Anti-selection, Senegal
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APA Style
Ndiaye, M. (2025). The Financing of Public Hospitals in Senegal: Taking into Account the Anti-selection. International Journal of Health Economics and Policy, 10(3), 90-99. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.hep.20251003.12
ACS Style
Ndiaye, M. The Financing of Public Hospitals in Senegal: Taking into Account the Anti-selection. Int. J. Health Econ. Policy 2025, 10(3), 90-99. doi: 10.11648/j.hep.20251003.12
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Download@article{10.11648/j.hep.20251003.12,
author = {Mansoum Ndiaye},
title = {The Financing of Public Hospitals in Senegal: Taking into Account the Anti-selection
},
journal = {International Journal of Health Economics and Policy},
volume = {10},
number = {3},
pages = {90-99},
doi = {10.11648/j.hep.20251003.12},
url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.hep.20251003.12},
eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.hep.20251003.12},
abstract = {The objective of our study was to analyze the anti-selection that exists between the state and public hospitals in Senegal. The use of a theoretical model to highlight hospital regulation has led to a number of important results. Indeed, the optimal solution consists in introducing a distortion in the cost reduction effort required to achieve an arbitrage between productive efficiency and the extraction of the hospital’s rent. The use of a menu of non-linear contracts for hospital funding is consistent with a cost reimbursement policy (such as the overall envelope policy) while a menu of linear contracts is modelled on the fixed-price pricing system (for example, by pathology or activity).},
year = {2025}
}
TY - JOUR T1 - The Financing of Public Hospitals in Senegal: Taking into Account the Anti-selection AU - Mansoum Ndiaye Y1 - 2025/07/28 PY - 2025 N1 - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.hep.20251003.12 DO - 10.11648/j.hep.20251003.12 T2 - International Journal of Health Economics and Policy JF - International Journal of Health Economics and Policy JO - International Journal of Health Economics and Policy SP - 90 EP - 99 PB - Science Publishing Group SN - 2578-9309 UR - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.hep.20251003.12 AB - The objective of our study was to analyze the anti-selection that exists between the state and public hospitals in Senegal. The use of a theoretical model to highlight hospital regulation has led to a number of important results. Indeed, the optimal solution consists in introducing a distortion in the cost reduction effort required to achieve an arbitrage between productive efficiency and the extraction of the hospital’s rent. The use of a menu of non-linear contracts for hospital funding is consistent with a cost reimbursement policy (such as the overall envelope policy) while a menu of linear contracts is modelled on the fixed-price pricing system (for example, by pathology or activity). VL - 10 IS - 3 ER -
Department of Training, African Center for Graduate Studies in Management, Dakar, Senegal
